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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is a securities fraud plaintiff precluded as a matter of law from 
sufficiently pleading economic loss and/or loss causation if she had the 
opportunity to sell her stock for a gain subsequent to a defendant-
company’s corrective disclosure?1  Recently, in Acticon AG v. China 
North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., the Second Circuit answered in the 
negative, allowing plaintiffs who alleged securities fraud to progress 
past the pleading stage despite having the opportunity to sell their 
stock for a gain on several occasions.2  This decision abrogated three 
federal district court decisions within the Second Circuit,3 and stood 
in direct contrast to two federal district court decisions from outside 
the Second Circuit.4 
Those five federal district courts relied principally on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, in 
which the Court clarified the pleading standard for private securities 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A. Political Science, 
La Salle University, 2011. Many thanks to Chris Rojao, Brian Jacek, John Badagliacca, 
Matt Engel, and Professor Ron Riccio for their editorial assistance.  
 1  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2010) (establishing the pleading requirements 
for a private securities fraud action under SEC Rule 10b-5); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (listing the six elements necessary for a private 
securities fraud action pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78a (2006)). 
 2  Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41–42 (2d 
Cir. 2012).  
 3  See generally In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 
2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-
01695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007); Malin v. XL 
Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 
2005).  
 4  See generally In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 
384421, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011); Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 
2009).  
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actions.5  In Dura, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not 
sufficiently plead loss causation simply by alleging and then 
establishing that the stock price was inflated on the day of purchase 
due to misrepresentation; instead, plaintiffs must prove that the 
misrepresentation proximately caused their loss.6  Seemingly 
extending that principle, the five federal district courts held that 
when the stock in question returns to or eclipses its pre-disclosure 
price, the plaintiffs have not suffered any economic loss, and thus 
cannot sufficiently assert that the defendants’ alleged fraud 
proximately caused any loss.7  The Acticon decision, however, has 
called into doubt both the district courts’ interpretation of Dura and 
the future of private securities actions in which a stock price, despite 
allegations of fraud, subsequently rises above its purchase price after 
a corrective disclosure. 
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit should have 
followed the district courts’ interpretation of Dura, both from a legal 
and logical standpoint.8  Part II analyzes the relevant securities laws 
and the history of loss causation and economic loss.9  Part III looks at 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura, the five district court decisions 
interpreting its revised pleading standard for private securities fraud 
actions, and the Acticon decision.10  Part IV explains how the Second 
Circuit misinterpreted Dura, why the district courts’ interpretation is 
superior, what the Second Circuit should have done to extend Dura 
and the principles of the relevant securities laws, and the 
ramifications that will follow.11  This Comment concludes by 
suggesting that the Supreme Court clarify the pleading standard for 
both economic loss and loss causation in private securities fraud 
cases.12 
 
 
 5  544 U.S. at 347–48. 
 6  Id. at 344–47.  
 7  See, e.g., Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43 (noting that  if a stock “could have been 
sold at a profit [after the close of the class period], the ‘actual economic loss’ 
contemplated in Dura is precluded”); Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4 (“[A] price 
fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally equivalent to 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of an artificially inflated purchase price alone as 
economic loss.”).  
 8  See infra Part IV.A. 
 9  See infra Part II.  
 10  See infra Part III. 
 11  See infra Part IV. 
 12  See infra Part V.  
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II. THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND LOSS CAUSATION IN 
SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
Economic loss and loss causation in securities fraud actions have 
a relatively short, complex history.  Congress passed the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to regulate secondary 
markets after the Great Depression.13  Shortly thereafter, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in furtherance of § 
10(b) of the Exchange Act, promulgated Rule 10b-5, which generally 
made it unlawful to issue false or misleading statements in relation to 
the purchase or sale of securities.14  Since § 10(b) did not explicitly 
create a private cause of action for plaintiffs, and since the SEC did 
not define the contours of a 10b-5 action, interpretations of both the 
statute and the Rule were left primarily to the courts, which have 
implied a private cause of action for an alleged 10b-5 violation since 
at least 1946.15 
Additionally, since Rule 10b-5 is largely a judge-interpreted, 
judge-made device, the elements of such an action have developed 
over time.  Since at least 1974, however, courts have inferred loss 
causation as an element of a 10b-5 claim,16 interpreting it as a concept 
comparable to the doctrine of proximate cause in tort law.17  This 
judicial inference persisted until 1995, when Congress passed the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which codified 
loss causation as an explicit element of a Rule 10b-5 claim.18 
Beyond just codifying the elements of a 10b-5 claim, the PSLRA, 
given the “uncertainties” of Rule 10b-5 and “conflicting legal 
standards,” also sought to curb abuses of the securities laws, which 
had manifested itself in the form of many meritless claims over the 
 
 13  15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2006).  
 14  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 729 (1975). 
 15  See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n. 10 (1983) (citing 
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), as the first court to 
imply a right of action for an alleged 10b-5 violation).  
 16  See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
 17  See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-
Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharms., 36  SEC.  REG. L.J. 31, 33  (2008); see, e.g., 
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 
2003) (comparing loss causation to proximate cause); Castellano v. Young & 
Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 
968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).  
 18  Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codi• ed at 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(b)(4) (2010)).  
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last few decades.19  As a result, the PSLRA heightened the pleading 
standard for securities fraud cases by forcing plaintiffs to plead 
certain elements with particularity.20  What is unclear, however, is 
whether either the PSLRA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require a heightened pleading standard for loss causation—an issue 
that courts have addressed with varying conclusions.21 
Although the PSLRA does not explicitly list economic loss as an 
element of a 10b-5 action, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
rule to require plaintiffs to plead economic loss.22  In fact, in Dura, 
the Court listed the “basic elements” of a § 10(b) claim, and included 
both economic loss and loss causation.23  Although listed as 
independent elements, economic loss and loss causation are often 
inextricably linked in a 10b-5 case, because a plaintiff must have 
suffered an economic loss before she can claim that the defendant’s 
alleged fraud is the proximate cause of that loss.24  To illustrate, the 
Supreme Court has said that loss causation “requires a plaintiff to 
show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the 
market price also caused a subsequent economic loss,” linking the two 
elements into one analysis.25  Thus, for the purposes of this 
Comment, a court that determines that a plaintiff has failed to 
sufficiently plead economic loss is sufficiently analogous to another 
court holding that the plaintiff has failed to plead loss causation since 
she cannot show that she suffered an economic loss.26 
 
 19   S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683–84; see 
also Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 741 (noting that the potential for abuse of the discovery 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be more likely in cases 
connected to the Exchange Act than other types of litigation). 
 20  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (requiring a plaintiff to plead the requisite 
state of mind (‘scienter’) and ‘misrepresentation’ with particularity).  
 21  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 22  See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(b)(4) and including economic loss as one of the six elements of a 10b-5 
claim).  
 23  Id. at 341–42.  
 24  Id. at 336 (“An inflated purchase price will not by itself constitute or 
proximately cause the relevant economic loss needed to allege and prove ‘loss 
causation.’”) (emphasis added).  
 25  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see 
also Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 
2003)) (defining loss causation as “the causal link between the alleged misconduct 
and the economic [loss] ultimately suffered by the plaintiff”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
935, 935 (2005). 
 26  Compare Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that 
the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to set forth facts demonstrating actual economic damages 
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III. DURA AND THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS 
OF ITS PRINCIPLES 
A.  Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
In Dura, the plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 case against Dura 
Pharmaceuticals (“Dura”), alleging that Dura made false statements 
concerning the expected Food and Drug Administration approval of 
a new asthmatic spray device, and that these false statements resulted 
in an artificially inflated stock price.27  The district court granted 
Dura’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the plaintiffs could not 
sufficiently plead a causal connection between the alleged 
misrepresentation and the plaintiffs’ economic loss.28  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the case, positing that the plaintiffs 
could sufficiently plead loss causation merely by alleging that the 
security’s price was inflated at the time of purchase due to the 
misrepresentation.29  After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
concluding that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently plead loss 
causation or economic loss.30  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Breyer identified three areas where the Ninth Circuit erred: its 
interpretation of “fraud-on-the-market” cases,31 its lack of 
precedential support,32 and its oversight of important objectives of 
securities laws.33 
First, the Ninth Circuit originally held that the plaintiffs need 
only prove that the stock price was inflated on the date of purchase due 
to the alleged misrepresentation,34 but the Court held that in a 
normal “fraud-on-the-market” case, such as this one, an inflated 
purchase price alone does not proximately cause economic loss.35  
 
within the context of loss causation as required by Dura“) (emphasis added), with In re 
China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353–54 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that “the absence of economic loss is sufficient grounds for 
dismissal [of the complaint]”) (emphasis added). 
 27  Dura, 544 U.S. at 336.  
 28  Id. at 340; In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 99CV0151-L(NLS), 
2001 WL 35925887, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2001).  
 29  Dura, 544 U.S. at 340; Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 939 (9th 
Cir. 2003).  
 30  Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–46.  
 31  Id. at 342. 
 32  Id. at 343–44. 
 33  Id. at 345. 
 34  Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938. 
 35  Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.  
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The Court concluded that “as a matter of pure logic,” a plaintiff does 
not suffer any loss at the time of the purchase, since “the inflated 
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant 
possesses equivalent value.”36  Beyond that, the Court found that the 
logical link between an inflated purchase price and any subsequent 
economic loss was not conclusive, as the sale of stock at a lower price 
after a corrective disclosure “might mean a later loss.  But that is far 
from inevitably so.”37  In fact, the Court specifically noted that a lower 
price could reflect changing economic circumstances or investor 
expectations rather than a causal connection to the alleged 
misrepresentation.38 
Second, the Court pointed out that the Ninth Circuit’s central 
holding lacked precedential support, as private securities fraud 
actions usually resemble common law fraud actions, which require a 
plaintiff to show not only that she would not have acted had she 
known the truth, but that she actually suffered economic loss.39  Given 
the requirement that a plaintiff show actual damages, the Court 
found it unsurprising that other federal courts of appeals had both 
previously and subsequently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.40  
The Court further noted that both the Restatement of Torts and 
other treatises writers emphasized the need to prove, rather than 
merely assert, loss causation.41 
Finally, the Court declared that the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
contravened the purposes and principles of the federal securities 
laws, which, in the Court’s opinion, make private actions available 
“not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, 
but to protect them against those economic losses that 
misrepresentations actually cause.”42  Again, the PSLRA requires 
 
 36  Id.  
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. at 342–43 (also mentioning that “new industry-specific or firm-specific 
facts,” rather than the alleged fraud, could lead to the declining stock price).  
 39  Id. at 343–44.  
 40  Id. at 344; see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 
343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that allegations of an inflated purchase 
price alone could not satisfy pleading loss causation); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 
223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 
1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).  
 41  Dura, 544 U.S. at 344–45; see W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. 
KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, p. 767 
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §548A cmt. b, at 107 (1977).  
 42  Dura, 544 U.S. at 345; cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]llowing recovery in the 
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plaintiffs to “specify” each misleading statement,43 plead certain 
elements with particularity,44 and carry the burden of proving that the 
defendant’s misrepresentations “caused the loss for which the 
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”45  Given these statutory 
requirements, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
would “allow recovery where a misrepresentation leads to an inflated 
purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately cause any 
economic loss.  That is to say, it would permit recovery where . . . two 
traditional elements. . . are missing.”46 
Due largely to these three concerns, the Court ultimately 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint was 
insufficient to state a claim for relief.47  Importantly, however, the 
Court left two issues undecided: what types of specific facts a 10b-5 
plaintiff must produce in order to sufficiently plead loss causation,48 
and whether a heightened pleading standard, pursuant to the PSLRA 
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to loss causation.49  As 
a result of these two issues, the lower federal courts have interpreted 
Dura in various ways, culminating in the Second Circuit’s recent 
decision in Acticon.50 
B.  Post-Dura Cases Involving Economic Loss and Loss Causation 
Although the Dura Court left the two aforementioned issues 
unresolved or unclear, various federal district courts—including the 
district court decision that Acticon reversed51—have interpreted Dura’s 
principles and framework in the same fashion—one diametrically 
opposed to the Second Circuit’s interpretation. 
 
face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance 
. . . would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investor’s insurance. There 
is no support in the Securities Exchange Act, the Rule, or our cases for such a 
result.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2010).  
 44  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 45  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).  
 46  Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.  
 47  Id. at 342–46.  
 48  Id. at 346 (declining to address separate proximate cause or loss-causation 
arguments).  
 49  Id. (assuming, for argument’s sake, that the securities statutes do not impose a 
heightened pleading standard, but noting that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient 
under either a Rule 8 or Rule 9 analysis).  
 50  See infra Part III.C. 
 51  See generally In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 
2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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1.  Malin v. XL Capital Ltd. 
Decided just a few months after Dura, Malin was the first case to 
interpret and apply Dura to a situation where the allegedly inflated 
stock price almost or fully recovered subsequent to a corrective 
disclosure.52  In Malin, the plaintiffs alleged a Rule 10b-5 violation, 
asserting that the defendants issued false and misleading statements 
concerning the company’s financial circumstances, leading to an 
inflated share price that fell after subsequent disclosures.53  
Furthermore, in an attempt to distinguish Dura, the plaintiffs 
suggested that not only was there an inflated price, but that the price 
drop was causally related to the subsequent disclosure.54 
In response, however, the defendants presented evidence that 
the share prices fully recovered just a few months after the class 
period ended.55  With that in mind, the court posited that the 
defendants’ evidence negated the plaintiffs’ inference that there was 
a causal connection between the misleading statements and the price 
drop.56  In its central holding, the Malin court ruled that “a price 
fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally 
equivalent to [Dura’s] rejection of an artificially inflated purchase 
price alone as economic loss. If the current value is commensurate to the 
purchase prices, there is no loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was 
artificially inflated.”57  As a result, the court granted the defendants’ 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint.58 
2.  In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation 
In In re Veeco, the lead plaintiff and defendants presented the 
court with several motions in limine concerning alleged 
misrepresentations in Veeco’s press releases.59  In the defendants’ 
motion to preclude the lead plaintiff’s damages expert from offering 
certain calculations as to potential damages, the defendants first 
asked the court to prevent the expert from arguing that the damages 
 
 52  See generally Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 
2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005). 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at *3.  
 55  Id. at *4.  
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. (emphasis added).  
 58  Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4.  
 59  See generally In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695 
(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007). 
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provision of the PSLRA was a means of measuring actual damages.60  
In the defendants’ estimation, the PSLRA provided a cap on 
damages, rather than a measure of damages.61  The court agreed, 
holding that § 21(D) of the PSLRA imposed a cap on the damages 
available to plaintiffs, rather than measuring the amount of 
damages.62 
Second, the defendants argued that the expert should not be 
allowed to take into account any damages for shares sold after the 
corrective disclosure at a price equal to or greater than the allegedly 
inflated share price.63  Again, the court agreed with the defendants, 
noting that the plaintiff’s damages expert also agreed when he stated 
in his expert report that “[i]f either the inflation or price increased 
over the holding period for any particular share, the share was not 
damaged, so the damage for that share is zero.”64 
Finally, the defendants asked the court to preclude expert 
testimony regarding any damages for the then-unsold shares that 
were purchased prior to the corrective disclosure.65  The court first 
noted that neither the PSLRA nor Dura imposed a “sell to sue” 
requirement, but then reasoned that, under Dura, a plaintiff must 
nevertheless still prove that she suffered an economic loss.66  In that 
regard, the court directly relied on the Malin court’s interpretation of 
Dura—that a plaintiff holding stock that was commensurate to its 
purchase price suffered no damages, even if the purchase price was 
artificially inflated.67  Thus, the court held that “[p]laintiffs who chose 
to retain their shares past the point when the stock price first 
recovered [to its purchase price] can prove no economic loss that is 
attributable to any of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.”68  
Significantly, the court further noted that this analysis was in accord 
with the lead plaintiff’s own damages expert’s conclusion that a 
plaintiff suffers no damages if a share price increases over the 
holding period.69  As a result, the court ultimately granted the 
defendants’ motion in limine to prevent the plaintiff’s damages expert 
 
 60  Id. at *6.  
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id.  
 64  Id. 
 65  In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7.  
 66  Id.  
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
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from portraying the damages provisions of the PSLRA as a means of 
calculating damages rather than as a cap on damages.70 
3.  Ross v. Walton 
In this 2009 case, the plaintiffs purchased Allied Capital stock 
over a fifteen month period before Allied made a corrective 
disclosure that caused the stock price to drop from $33 at the 
beginning of January 10, 2007, to $31.58 at the end of that day, to 
$27.79 at the opening on January 11.71  Additionally, in the ninety 
days that followed, Allied’s stock never closed at a price above $32.72  
Consequently, the plaintiffs sought damages pursuant to the 
Exchange Act and the PSLRA.73 
Apparently conceding that there was no “sell to sue” rule, the 
defendants instead presented evidence that the stock was trading at a 
profit one month before the plaintiffs filed their amended 
complaint.74  Therefore, the defendants relied on Malin’s 
“commensurate value” holding, arguing that the plaintiffs should be 
precluded from pleading loss causation.75  In this case, similar to the 
plaintiffs in Malin, the plaintiffs argued that they need only allege 
that a misrepresentation caused a facially plausible price drop.76  The 
Ross court disagreed with the plaintiffs, noting that it was “unaware of 
any authority in which actual economic loss was found when the stock 
value returned to pre-disclosure prices and could have been sold at a 
profit just after the class period.”77  In fact, the court acknowledged 
that it was undisputed that the plaintiffs could have sold their stock 
for a profit on at least three occasions in June 2007, a few months 
after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint.78  Thus, while the court 
agreed that there was no “sell to sue” rule, it concluded that Malin’s 
interpretation of Dura was correct, in that Dura’s rationale precludes 
a plaintiff from pleading “actual economic loss” if the stock could 
have been sold for a profit after the corrective disclosure.79  The court 
 
 70  Id. at *7, *9.  
 71  Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35–36, 41 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 72  Id. at 41.  
 73  Id. at 35.  
 74  Id. at 42.  
 75  Id.; see Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at 
*4 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005). 
 76  Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43.  
 77  Id. at 43.  
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
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further asserted that, “[l]ogically, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the 
amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than 
the purchase price on multiple occasions.”80 
Finally, the court noted that since a § 10(b) claim involves fraud, 
the plaintiffs must, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b),81 plead the circumstances giving rise to fraud with particularity.82  
Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs could have sold their shares for a 
profit on various occasions after filing their complaint, the court 
found that “even under the Rule 8(a)(2) ‘facially plausible’ standard, 
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate economic loss beyond a simple 
fluctuation in value or, at best, an artificially inflated purchase price, 
specifically rejected by Dura.”83  As a result, the court granted the 
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the fact that the 
plaintiffs could have sold their stock for a gain precluded them from 
pleading loss as a matter of law.84 
4. In re Immucor, Inc. Securities Litigation 
In this motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff claimed that the 
court erroneously dismissed its claim that Immucor violated § 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act by making false and misleading statements with 
regard to its compliance with FDA regulations.85  In its initial order, 
the court held that the plaintiff was precluded from pleading 
economic loss and loss causation since Immucor’s share price 
“quickly rebounded” to pre-disclosure levels after each corrective 
disclosure.86  The plaintiff argued that the court’s conclusion was a 
“clear error of law,” but the court, relying on both Ross and Malin—
where the stock prices reached or eclipsed the plaintiffs’ purchase 
prices—denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.87  
Specifically, even though the plaintiff tried to distinguish this case 
from Ross and Malin, the court held that: 
[G]iven the many factors that can affect share price, 
contrasting the price immediately before the corrective 
disclosure . . . and the price shortly thereafter provides the 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 82  Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
 83  Id. at 43. 
 84  Id. 
 85  In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09 CV 2351 TWT, 2011 WL 3844221, at 
*1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011).  
 86  Id. at *2. 
 87  Id. at *2–3.  
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most relevant comparison for evaluating whether the stock 
price dropped significantly following the corrective 
disclosure and whether the disclosure caused the drop in 
price.88 
As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FDA-related 
securities fraud claims due to the plaintiff’s inability to plead actual 
economic loss or loss causation.89 
5.  In re China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Securities 
Litigation 
In In re China North East, the lead plaintiff, Acticon, purchased 
approximately sixty thousand shares of China North East Petroleum 
Holdings Ltd. (“NEP”) over the course of five months—January 2010 
to May 2010.90  Ultimately, Acticon spent $434,950 for those sixty 
thousand shares, resulting in an average price of $7.25 per share.91  
Following those purchases, NEP made multiple corrective disclosures 
to its financial statements from prior years, leading Acticon to file suit 
against NEP for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.92  NEP issued its 
final corrective disclosure on September 1, 2010,93 but NEP stock 
closed above approximately $7.25 on twelve separate days between 
October and November 2010.94  Seizing on that fact, the district court 
determined that, because the plaintiffs could have sold their shares 
for a profit on multiple occasions following the corrective disclosures, 
Dura’s principles—and Malin’s persuasive interpretation of those 
principles—precluded the plaintiffs from pleading economic loss.95 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that they should be able to 
sue based on the losses suffered from the sales of stock they made 
between December 2010 and May 2011.96  In response, the court 
recognized that the plaintiffs had suffered a loss, but ultimately held 
 
 88  Id. at *2.  The court’s language seems to imply that Immucor’s stock never 
fully recovered to its pre-disclosure price, but the court had previously said that the 
stock did “quickly rebound[] to pre-disclosure levels after each of the FDA-related 
disclosures.” Id. 
 89  Id. at *3.  
 90  In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 91  Id.  
 92  Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
 93  In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
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that the plaintiffs could not impute their loss to any of NEP’s alleged 
misrepresentations.97  To that end, the court posited that “[a] 
plaintiff who forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective 
disclosure cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused 
by the disclosure.”98  Thus, the court granted the defendant’s three 
motions to dismiss the consolidated complaint, becoming the fifth 
district court out of five to interpret Dura as precluding pleading loss 
causation/economic loss when the stock price had approached or 
eclipsed the purchase price subsequent to a corrective disclosure.99 
C.  Primary Case: Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum 
Holdings Ltd. 
After the In re China plaintiffs appealed the district court’s 
decision, the Second Circuit, in a matter of first impression, reversed 
the district court, holding that the plaintiffs were not precluded as a 
matter of law from pleading economic loss just because the stock 
price had risen higher than the investors’ average purchase price 
subsequent to the corrective disclosures.100  Specifically, the Second 
Circuit noted that the district court’s limitation on damages was 
inconsistent with both the “out of pocket” measure of damages 
traditionally used in § 10(b) actions and with the “bounce back” 
damages cap in the PSLRA.101 
First, the Second Circuit observed that the “out of pocket” 
measure of damages has traditionally been used to determine 
economic loss in § 10(b) cases.102  Under that measure, “a defrauded 
buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of what he 
paid over the value of what he got.”103  Moreover, the Second Circuit 
reasoned that the Supreme Court has adopted the “out of pocket” 
measure of damages, defining it as “the difference between the fair 
value of” the plaintiff’s purchase and the fair value of what the 
plaintiff would have received absent the fraud.104  As a result, the 
Second Circuit determined that the district court erred by failing to 
apply the “out of pocket” method of damages, asserting that, aside 
 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 354.  
 100  Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 34, 36 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 101  Id. at 39.  
 102  Id. at 38.  
 103  Id. (quoting Levine v. Seilon, 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971)).  
 104  Id. (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).  
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from the “bounce back” provision in the PSLRA, Congress had not 
otherwise altered the traditional method for calculating damages.105 
The Second Circuit further held that the district court’s 
conclusion was inconsistent with the PSLRA’s “bounce back” 
provision, which caps the amount of damages a plaintiff can receive 
in a securities fraud action.106  Under that provision, a plaintiff’s 
damages cannot exceed the difference between the plaintiff’s 
purchase price of the security and the security’s average trading price 
in the ninety days following the final corrective disclosure.107  Thus, 
the Second Circuit concluded that Acticon would have only been 
precluded from pleading loss causation under the PSLRA if NEP’s 
average trading price over the ninety days following the last corrective 
disclosure would have exceeded the plaintiffs’ purchase price.108 
In addition to these two apparent inconsistencies, the Second 
Circuit determined that the Malin line of reasoning—on which the 
trial court below relied—incorrectly interpreted Dura.109  According 
to the Second Circuit, those interpretations erroneously used as their 
starting point the Court’s observation that “at the moment the 
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated 
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant 
possesses equivalent value.”110  After reiterating that Dura did not 
affect the traditional “out of pocket” measure of damages, the Second 
Circuit posited that “a share of stock that has regained its value after a 
period of decline is not functionally equivalent to an inflated share 
that has never lost value . . . [because] it assumes that if there are any 
intervening losses, they can be offset by intervening gains.”111 
To that end, NEP argued that the security price recovery 
indicated that the market was unaffected by the corrective 
disclosures, and that the disclosures were thus unconnected to the 
plaintiffs’ claimed losses.112  At this stage of the litigation, however, 
the Second Circuit drew all reasonable inferences in favor of Acticon, 
and instead determined that the plaintiffs here, unlike the plaintiffs 
 
 105  Id. at 39.  
 106  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38–39; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2010).  
 107  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).  
 108  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (citing In re Mago Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 
461 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
 109  Id. at 40–41.  
 110  Id. (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 111  Id. at 41.  
 112  Id. at 39–40.  
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in Dura, had alleged more than an artificially inflated price—they had 
alleged that NEP’s stock dropped as a result of the corrective 
disclosures.113  Thus, since the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
were not precluded from pleading economic loss as a matter of law, it 
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for NEP.114 
IV. HOW THE ACTICON DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
LANGUAGE AND PRINCIPLES OF DURA 
After five federal district courts had uniformly interpreted Dura 
as precluding a plaintiff from pleading economic loss and/or loss 
causation when a security price recovers following a corrective 
disclosure, the Second Circuit’s Acticon decision turned that 
interpretation on its head, concluding the exact opposite and 
creating confusion for both courts and commentators.  This 
Comment argues that the district courts’ interpretation was superior 
as a matter of legal interpretation and in relation to the goals and 
principles of securities laws.  Finally, this Comment also considers the 
consequences of the Second Circuit’s decision moving forward. 
A. The Second Circuit Misinterpreted and Misapplied Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence in Acticon 
In its rejection of the district courts’ interpretation of Dura, the 
Second Circuit took umbrage with their damages analyses, essentially 
concluding that they had used the wrong starting point, and/or had 
misapplied the applicable measure of damages.115  Specifically, the 
Second Circuit’s assertion that the “out of pocket” measure of 
damages is traditionally used for § 10(b) cases is problematic for two 
reasons.  First, even if one accepted this proposition, loss causation 
would still be an issue.116  Second, one could reasonably argue that 
 
 113  Id. at 40–41.  
 114  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41–42.  
 115  Id. at 38–41 (analyzing the “traditional out of pocket” measure of damages for 
§10(b) cases, and concluding that the Malin court’s interpretation of Dura was 
inconsistent with that measure).  
 116  In fairness, the district court below based its holding on the premise that the 
plaintiffs could not plead economic loss as a matter of law, so the Second Circuit 
limited its holding to the same element. Theoretically, however, the district court, on 
remand, could determine that even though the plaintiffs were not precluded from 
pleading economic loss as a matter of law, that they had not sufficiently shown that 
the defendants’ corrective disclosures were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ 
“loss.” See supra Part II (linking the elements of economic loss and loss causation and 
determining that a plaintiff must essentially prove that she has suffered a loss before 
showing that the defendant’s actions proximately caused that loss).  
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Acticon is distinguishable because it presents the unusual 
circumstances where the stock price appears to have been 
unaffected—or the market unconcerned—despite allegations of 
fraud. 
Despite these considerations, even the Second Circuit’s reliance 
on the “out of pocket” measure of damages is questionable.  For 
example, the Acticon court asserted that the Supreme Court had 
“adopted the out-of-pocket measure of damages” in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States,117 but Affiliated Ute is readily distinguishable 
from Acticon, as the former primarily concerned the misstatement of 
a material fact in fraudulently-induced sales of stock in relation to 
Rule 10b-5 and the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act.118  
Additionally, the Supreme Court language on which the Second 
Circuit relied in Acticon concerned damages under the damages 
provision of § 28 of the Exchange Act,119 not § 10(b).120  Finally, in 
their brief to the Supreme Court, the Dura plaintiffs specifically 
quoted Affiliated Ute and its conclusion that the measure of damages 
should be “the difference between the fair value of all that the . . . 
seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had 
there been no fraudulent conduct.”121  Although the Supreme Court 
did not explicitly address this contention in Dura, the Court did hold 
for the defendants, which should be interpreted as the Court 
implicitly considering and rejecting this argument and its assessment 
of the supposedly relevant measure of damages.122  In that vein, since 
the Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument in Dura, it is 
unlikely that it would find the same argument—and the Second 
Circuit’s reliance on it—persuasive in the present, but admittedly 
different, securities fraud case. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit posited that the district 
courts’—specifically, the Malin court’s—reasoning was inconsistent 
with the “out of pocket” measure of damages and the PSLRA’s 
“bounce back” provision.123  In the Second Circuit’s estimation, the 
Malin court erroneously took as its starting point Dura’s observation 
 
 117  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 155 (1972)).  
 118  Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 128–33.  
 119  15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2006) 
 120  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155).  
 121  Respondents’ Brief, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 
03-932), 2004 WL 2671450, at *18 (quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154–55).  
 122  Dura, 544 U.S. at 344, 347–48.  
 123  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39.  
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that “at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has 
suffered no loss[, as] the inflated purchase payment is offset by 
ownership of a share that at that instant possess equivalent value.”124  
In support of its own interpretation of the PSLRA and the relevant 
measure of damages, the Second Circuit noted that: 
a share of stock that has regained its value after a period of 
decline is not functionally equivalent to an inflated share 
that has never lost value . . . [because] [i]n the absence of 
fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the security at an 
uninflated price and would have also benefitted from the 
unrelated gain in stock price.125 
This interpretation, while ostensibly logical, seems to have been 
foreclosed by Dura when the Supreme Court held that: 
[w]hen the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even 
at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, 
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or 
firm-specific facts . . . .  The same is true in respect to a claim 
that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have 
been . . . .126 
Echoing that sentiment and standing in accord with the 
Supreme Court, the SEC—which promulgated Rule 10b-5—asserted 
that, under these circumstances, a plaintiff does not suffer any loss at 
the time of purchase since she can immediately sell the shares 
without a loss.127  In light of these assertions, not only does the Second 
Circuit’s logic seem unconvincing—and possibly foreclosed—but the 
district courts’ analyses seem superior, since it extends the principles 
of both Dura and the SEC. 
As a result, the reasoning in a case like Ross v. Walton should 
have been more persuasive to the Second Circuit.  Read broadly, Ross 
is fairly analogous to Acticon—the plaintiffs had a chance to sell their 
securities for a profit after the class period ended but elected not 
to.128  In Ross, the court held that “if the stock’s value was 
commensurate to the pre-disclosure trading price after the close of 
the class period [and] could have been sold at a profit, the ‘actual 
 
 124  Id. at 40 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342).  
 125  Id. at 41.  
 126  Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43 (emphasis added).  
 127  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dura 
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564, at 
*21–22.  
 128  Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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economic loss’ contemplated in Dura is precluded.”129 
The Ross court further noted that even if there was “loss”—the 
issue in Acticon—Dura still requires a plaintiff to show that it was the 
corrective disclosure and not “one of the [other] ‘tangle of factors’ 
that affect[ed] price.”130  The Ross court then summarized its analysis 
by concluding that “[l]ogically, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the 
amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than 
the purchase price on multiple occasions.”131  Thus, these assertions 
mesh with and extend Dura’s conclusion that the securities fraud 
statutes are not meant to “provide investors with broad insurance 
against market losses, but to protect them against those economic 
losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”132  In this respect, and 
as an integral part of this overarching debate, the Court’s reasoning 
was based on economic loss, so it seems logical that a prospective gain 
would extend the Court’s analysis and yield no remedy for the 
plaintiffs in Acticon.133 
Additionally, the Second Circuit should have given more 
credence—if it paid any attention at all—to the plaintiff’s damages 
expert in In re Veeco.134  In that case, the plaintiff’s damages expert 
concluded that “[i]f either the inflation or price increased over the 
holding period for any particular share, that share was not damaged, 
so the damage for that share is zero.”135  As a result, the court 
ultimately concluded that any “[p]laintiffs who chose to retain their 
shares past the point when the stock price first recovered to the value 
at which the shares were purchased, can prove no economic loss that 
is attributable to any of the defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations”—a conclusion that the In re Veeco court noted 
comported with the damages expert’s deductions.136 
Furthermore, the Acticon decision seems to stand in contrast to 
the Court’s attempt to narrow Rule 10b-5 in Dura.  Specifically, the 
Court seemed to “err[] on the side of preventing valid suits instead of 
allowing invalid suits.”137  Additionally, “[b]y attempting to prevent 
 
 129  Id. at 43.  
 130  Id.  
 131  Id. 
 132  Dura, 544 U.S. at 345.  
 133  See id. 
 134  See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695(CM)(GAY), 
2007 WL 7630569, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007).  
 135  Id. at *6.  
 136  Id. at *7.  
 137  Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based 
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‘largely’ groundless suits along with completely groundless suits . . . 
the Supreme Court appears to provide courts guidance to error on 
the side of dismissing suits with [tenuous causal connections],”138 an 
issue that certainly comes into play when a security’s price equals or 
exceeds a plaintiff’s purchase price after the end of the class period. 
Finally, the Second Circuit noted, as part of its conclusion, that it 
was not aware of any federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases 
that had applied Malin’s interpretation of Dura and the securities 
fraud laws to cases where a stock price reached or exceeded a 
plaintiff’s purchase price subsequent to a corrective disclosure.139  
This observation seems overstated, however, as there do not appear 
to be any federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases that have 
adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning when applied to an 
analogous situation.  In fact, this was an issue of first impression for 
the Second Circuit140—which includes Wall Street within its 
jurisdiction—so the lack of support for Malin’s reasoning at the 
federal appellate levels should be neither dispositive nor persuasive.  
Regardless, for the aforementioned reasons, the Second Circuit has 
misinterpreted Dura and the relevant securities laws, and the district 
courts’ analyses of Dura are superior. 
 
B.  The Second Circuit Could Have Exacted a Heightened Pleading 
Standard on the Plaintiffs for Proving Economic Loss and/or Could 
Have Constructed Loss Causation Under the PSLRA Differently 
Even if the Second Circuit found the district courts’ 
interpretation of Dura unpersuasive, it could have still ruled for the 
defendants in two ways.  First, the court could have required the 
plaintiffs to plead economic loss and loss causation consistent with 
 
Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 48 (2008), available at 
http://hayboo.com/files/Publication/e19c0362-4e02-4672-b469 
-23791b644cfd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7f515f2d-d66c-442b-8582 
280bf1b53360/Pleading%2520and%2520Proving%2520Loss%2520Causation%2520i
n%2520Fraud-On-The-Market_Based%2520Securities%2520Suits%2520Po.pdf. 
 138  Id. at 62.  
 139  Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
 140  Jennifer L. Achilles & Sara R. Wolff, Second Circuit Holds that Stock Price Rebound 
after Disclosure of Fraud Does Not Negate Inference of Economic Loss at Pleading Stage of 
Securities Fraud Suit (Aug. 23, 2012), REEDSMITH.COM, 
http://www.reedsmith.com/Second-Circuit-Holds-that-Stock-Price-Rebound-after 
-Disclosure-of-Fraud-Does-Not-Negate-Inference-of-Economic-Loss-at-Pleading-Stage 
-of-Securities-Fraud-Suit-08-23-2012/. 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Next, the Second Circuit could 
have construed the term “loss causation” for 10b-5 claims consistently 
with the PSLRA’s definition of loss causation for § 12(a) claims under 
the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”). This section analyzes 
how both determinations could have affected the outcome of Acticon. 
1.  Heightened Pleading Standard for Economic 
Loss/Loss Causation 
At the outset, the Second Circuit acknowledged in Acticon that, 
“[a]fter Dura, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs must satisfy the 
‘short and plain statement of the claim’ standard demanded by Rule 
8(a)(2) or the more stringent heightened pleading requirements of 
Rule 9(b) in pleading economic loss.”141  The court then recognized 
that it could not find any federal circuit court decisions that 
addressed heightened pleading for economic loss, but that it had 
found a few decisions pertaining to the standard for loss causation.142  
Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit had 
imposed a heightened pleading standard for loss causation, the Fifth 
Circuit had not, and the Ninth Circuit had found it unnecessary to 
decide.143  As a result, the Second Circuit held that “[b]ecause we find 
that the price fluctuations here would not rebut an inference of 
economic loss under either standard, we, like the Ninth Circuit, find 
it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”144 
While the consequences of punting on the heightened pleading 
standard issue are analyzed in greater depth infra,145 the Second 
Circuit could have—and perhaps should have—adopted a 
heightened pleading standard for proving economic loss and loss 
causation, a determination that would have changed the outcome of 
the case. The first issue is whether the PSLRA itself requires a 
heightened pleading standard for these elements.  This argument 
can be dismissed, as the PSLRA explicitly provides that a plaintiff 
must “state with particularity” the facts surrounding both a material 
misstatement or omission and state of mind.146  Thus, one would 
reasonably expect that if Congress intended to exact a heightened 
pleading standard for economic loss and/or loss causation, it would 
 
 141  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 37.  
 142  Id. at 38. 
 143  Id. (citations omitted).  
 144  Id.  
 145  See infra Part IV.C. 
 146  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A) (2010). 
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have done so in the statute. 
Whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure necessitate a 
heightened pleading standard, however, is another matter.  For 
example, in Ross v. Walton, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause a claim 
under § 10(b) involves fraud, [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b) 
requires plaintiffs to plead ‘the circumstances constituting fraud’ with 
particularity.”147  This reasoning is persuasive for a few reasons.  First, 
before the PSLRA codified the elements of a § 10(b) claim, those 
private actions largely resembled common law fraud cases.148  Second, 
as part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, a plaintiff must still plead 
scienter—a staple of common law fraud cases149—with particularity.150  
In that respect, it seems logical to determine that because § 10(b) 
claims sound in fraud, both traditionally and currently, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure would require heightened pleading.  In fact, 
this logic is both persuasive and seems to comport with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence given the emphasis that the Court placed on the 
similarities between common law fraud and § 10(b) cases in Dura.151 
Alternatively, in Katyle v. Penn National Gaming, Inc., the Fourth 
Circuit set forth some compelling reasons for why the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure demand a heightened pleading standard for loss 
causation in 10b-5 cases.152  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit cited 
Supreme Court precedent, which noted that, “[p]rior to the 
enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for securities 
fraud was governed not by [the general pleading standard of] Rule 8, 
but by the heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b).”153  
Now, since the PSLRA explicitly provides for a heightened pleading 
standard for a few elements, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
statute supersedes Rule 9(b) in those regards.154 Since the PSLRA was 
silent as to the rest of the elements, however, the Fourth Circuit 
 
 147  Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 148  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (“In general, the case law 
developed in this Court with respect to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on 
doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doctrines of fraud and 
deceit.”). 
 149  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that common law fraud cases typically require proof 
of scienter).  
 150  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
 151  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–45 (2005).  
 152  637 F.3d 462, 471–72 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 153  Id. at n.5 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 
319 (2007)). 
 154  Id. 
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asserted that the statute does not affect past Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, meaning that Rule 9(b) still applies to those 
elements.155 
In Dura, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the 
PSLRA’s effect on the requisite pleading standard for loss causation, 
but the Court opted not to, determining that the plaintiffs could not 
satisfy the pleading standard under either Rule 8 or Rule 9.156  Given 
that deduction, the Court assumed, “for argument’s sake, that neither 
the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any special further 
requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or 
economic loss.”157  Nevertheless, absent further Supreme Court 
clarification, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation—decided six years 
after Dura—seems the most reasonable.  As a result, the Second 
Circuit, although under no obligation to accept the Fourth Circuit’s 
logic, would have been justified if it had adopted a similar view. 
2.  An Alternative Construction of the PSLRA Could Have 
Defeated the Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Acticon 
Although it is unclear whether the defendants in Acticon raised 
the following argument, the defendants could have prevailed on an 
alternative interpretation of the PSLRA and its definition of “loss 
causation.”  The Second Circuit’s decision in Acticon is premised on 
economic loss grounds, but, again, for the purposes of this Comment, 
the two elements go hand-in-hand, since even a plaintiff who can 
prove economic loss must still show that the defendant’s alleged 
fraud was the proximate cause of that loss.158 
As to that alternative interpretation, in the petitioner-
defendant’s brief to the Supreme Court in Dura, it argued that, under 
the principle of uniformity, the Court should consistently apply the 
PSLRA’s definition of loss causation in § 105, which amended and 
applied to § 12(a)(2) cases under the Securities Act,159 with the term 
“loss causation” used in Rule 10b-5 cases.160  Currently, the difference 
is that § 105 of the PSLRA provides an affirmative defense to § 
12(a)(2) cases if the defendant can prove lack of loss causation.161  
 
 155  Id.  
 156  Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.  
 157  Id. (emphasis added). 
 158  See supra Part II.  
 159  See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2006).  
 160  Brief of Petitioners, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 
03-932), 2004 WL 2075752, at *18–21. 
 161  See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2006). 
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Under § 105 of the PSLRA, § 12 plaintiffs cannot recover damages if 
the defendant “proves that any . . . or all of the [recoverable] 
amount . . . represents [something] other than the depreciation in 
value of the subject security resulting from [the alleged material 
misstatements or omissions].”162  If this definition of loss causation 
were applied to § 10(b) claims as well, then a defendant could defeat 
a Rule 10b-5 claim by showing that the security price subsequent to 
the end of the class period equaled or exceeded the plaintiff’s 
purchase price.  Although the Supreme Court did not address this 
argument in Dura, the SEC appears to support this construction, 
because it argued in its amicus brief to the Court that the PSLRA’s 
definition of loss causation should be consistent for both § 10(b) 
cases under the Exchange Act and § 12 cases under the Securities 
Act.163 
Even if the defendant in Acticon did not raise this argument, the 
Second Circuit could have considered it as part of its overall analysis 
of the PSLRA.  Regardless, this interpretation, which is seemingly 
supported by the SEC, could be used in the future to defeat the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation and to uphold the five district courts’ 
rulings. 
C. The Consequences of the Acticon Decision 
In Acticon, the Second Circuit ultimately determined that 
“[b]ecause we find that the price fluctuations here would not rebut 
an inference of economic loss under either standard, we, like the 
Ninth Circuit, find it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”164  
This Comment previously discussed why the Second Circuit could or 
should have adopted a pleading standard for economic loss and loss 
causation that was consistent with Rule 9(b),165 but absent such a 
proclamation, the Second Circuit’s decision to abstain from deciding 
the issue is also problematic for two reasons.  First, the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion that the price fluctuations would not have 
rebutted an inference of economic loss is questionable, and second, 
its decision to punt on the issue, theoretically, leaves the decision up 
to the district courts within the Second Circuit. 
 
 162  Id. 
 163  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dura 
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564, at 
*25–26.  
 164  Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
 165  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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By failing to specify a standard, however, one can envision the 
tension that would arise if a district court within the Second Circuit 
determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applied to a 
case analogous to Acticon, and thus concluded that the plaintiff had 
failed to sufficiently plead economic loss or loss causation.  In this 
scenario, the district court—perhaps relying on logic similar to that 
of the Fourth Circuit in Katyle—would likely be reversed by the 
Second Circuit, based on Acticon.166  Thus, one could reasonably argue 
that the Second Circuit, by passing on the issue, impliedly supported 
the less stringent pleading standard, suggesting a more plaintiff-
friendly approach to 10b-5 cases within the Second Circuit. 
Next, the Second Circuit held that Acticon had satisfied the 
pleading requirements set forth in Dura, since it had “alleged 
something more than the mere fact that it purchased NEP shares at 
an inflated price; specifically, it allege[d] that the price of NEP stock 
dropped after the alleged fraud became known.”167  This conclusion 
seems partly premised on the PSLRA’s “bounce back” provision and 
the average stock price over the ninety days following the final 
corrective disclosure, but since the “bounce back” provision is a 
damages cap, this conclusion is questionable for a few reasons. 
First, it begs the question whether the Second Circuit would find 
that a plaintiff had met the pleading standard for a § 10(b) claim if 
the security price rose immediately after the corrective disclosure—
for example, the very next day after a corrective disclosure.  If that 
were the case—that an immediate gain would break any causal link 
between the alleged fraud and any “loss”—then how immediately 
must the gain occur?  In Acticon, NEP’s stock eclipsed the plaintiffs’ 
purchase price on twelve different occasions, with the first instance 
occurring as soon as a month after the final corrective disclosure.168  
Following that logic, it seems that a plaintiff could sufficiently plead a 
§ 10(b) claim so long as the stock price did not immediately rise after a 
corrective disclosure.  If this analysis overextends the Second Circuit’s 
logic, however, the alternative view seems to be an arbitrary 
determination of how long after a corrective disclosure a stock price 
can recover before it falls outside of Acticon’s holding—one week? 
Two weeks? Seemingly not one month, though, or NEP would have 
 
 166  See generally Acticon, 692 F.3d 34.  
 167  Id. at 40.  
 168  In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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prevailed.169 
Next, the Second Circuit was persuaded to dismiss NEP’s motion 
to dismiss because the plaintiffs had alleged “something more” than 
the Dura plaintiffs, who had merely claimed an inflated stock price;170 
namely, the plaintiffs in Acticon had alleged that “the price of NEP 
stock dropped after the alleged fraud became known.”171  As a result, 
this seems to suggest that any plaintiff who can both claim that she 
purchased securities at an artificially inflated price and can point to 
evidence that the stock price dropped after a corrective disclosure 
has met the pleading standards.  By this logic, though, it seems too 
easy for plaintiffs to meet the pleading standard in an analogous § 
10(b) case.  To illustrate, while publicly traded companies may 
occasionally have to issue corrective disclosures, not all of them will 
be pursuant to nefarious actions by the company.172  Under a broad 
interpretation of the Second Circuit’s holding, however, all a plaintiff 
has to do—assuming all other 10b-5 elements are equal—is show that 
there was both a corrective disclosure and an immediate drop in the 
stock price.  Therein lies a problem, though, because the security in 
question might have dropped on that particular day for reasons 
completely unrelated to the corrective disclosure—for example, poor 
earnings in the relevant quarter from a properly filed form, industry-
wide news affecting all relevant stock prices, or the potential merger 
of the company-in-question’s two biggest competitors.  As it now 
stands, however, a corrective disclosure coupled with a drop in stock 
price seems sufficient to plead economic loss and/or loss causation 
under Acticon.173  While satisfying the pleading standard in the federal 
court system is not meant to be an arduous task,174 Acticon’s holding 
may inevitably lead to more frivolous lawsuits—the very thing that 
 
 169  See id. 
 170  Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40.  
 171  Id. 
 172  See Michael Coffino & Marc Goldich, To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Public Company 
Strategies in Packaging Corrective Disclosures in Press Releases (2008), 
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2008/07/articles/forums/ 
to-bundle-or-not-to-bundle-public-company-strategies-in-packaging 
-corrective-disclosures-in-press-releases/ (arguing that viewing “corrective disclosures 
in a vacuum can precipitate a rush to judgment by potential class action plaintiffs or 
their lawyers . . . to launch a securities fraud class action”).  
 173  See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40–41.  
 174  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 
is plausible [i.e. not “probable”] on its face.’”).  
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Congress designed the PSLRA to prevent.175  Additionally, most 10b-5 
cases that pass the pleading stage are likely to settle,176 since, beyond 
that point, it is probably more cost-effective for the defendant to pay 
out—even if it has done nothing wrong—rather than engage in what 
would likely be an expensive discovery process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s decision causes a lot of 
uncertainty.  The five federal district court cases that addressed this 
issue have all interpreted Dura and the relevant securities fraud 
statutes in a similar way, bringing some clarity.  With its holding, the 
Second Circuit has created confusion in this area of the law, and has 
given future defendants one less arrow in their quiver with which to 
defeat these claims before proceeding to the costly stage of discovery.  
Moving forward, the Supreme Court should clarify a few of the main 
issues from Acticon soon—specifically, whether Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8 or 9 applies to economic loss and loss causation, and, 
more importantly, whether a plaintiff is or is not precluded as a 
matter of law from pleading economic loss or loss causation when her 
stock price becomes commensurate to her purchase price following a 
corrective disclosure.  Until then, future defendants within the 
Second Circuit will have to live with a decision that, legally and 
logically, seems to contravene both the principles of the federal 
securities laws and past Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 
 
 175  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) 
(noting that the PSLRA was designed to be “a check against abusive litigation in 
private securities fraud actions”).  
 176  See Thomas F. Gillespie III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed 
Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule 10b-5 
Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 174 (2008), available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:8qzGRSCUuUMJ:www.law.umaryland
.edu/academics/journals/jbtl/issues/3_1/3_1_161_Gillespie.pdf 
+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiZ-
CLpseVDzbGPkZ3J0WLAXDAihMeUtnGSwpH_MdSHDLJa5OowRd8dxUFo59fDX6l
pQqH33RXJcbyaiZ6G_NtB5S2DdiL6HrbwpPBvqGKbCSQJ6J6VFbzcvrfwLxapNuH7Q
-bj&sig=AHIEtbS3KIMzZwNUBjdrBUpEiah5N0ayww (remarking that the pleading 
stage of 10b-5 cases is so important because “so few, if any, Rule 10b-5 cases go to 
trial”).  
